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The typical finding from studies of metacomprehen-
sion is that monitoring accuracy is quite poor. Readers’ 
judgments of their comprehension and their actual per-
formance on tests correlate only at about .27 (for reviews, 
see Lin & Zabrucky, 1998; Maki, 1998; Weaver, Bryant, 
& Burns, 1995). These results show that readers have poor 
relative accuracy, meaning that they are unable to judge 
how their understanding varies from one text to the next. 
Without accurate metacognitive monitoring, readers will 
be ineffective in regulating their studying, strategies, and 
cognitive efforts that produce increased learning (e.g., 
Nelson & Narens, 1990; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999).
In the present investigations, we explore two factors that 
may contribute to poor relative metacomprehension accu-
racy: (1) the requirement to carry out both text processing 
and monitoring processes concurrently and (2) limited ac-
cessibility of valid cues that predict comprehension. In 
the first experiment, we investigated whether individual 
differences assumed to relate to executing the concurrent 
tasks would predict monitoring accuracy but would be-
come less relevant after rereading. The second experiment 
replicated Experiment 1 while also testing whether a self-
explain task designed to shift readers to an inference level 
of text processing would improve monitoring accuracy for 
all readers, presumably by increasing access to inference-
level monitoring cues.
Successful metacomprehension monitoring requires 
the execution of two separate tasks. Readers are typically 
given the goal of reading for comprehension, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly via the existence of comprehension 
tests. In fact, it makes little sense to ask readers to monitor 
their comprehension if they do not already have the goal of 
comprehension. However, monitoring of comprehension 
is a separate, additional task above and beyond reading for 
comprehension. Just because readers understand a text’s 
meaning (i.e., comprehension) does not mean they have 
also correctly assessed how complete their understanding 
of the text actually is (i.e., metacomprehension).
The implications of metacomprehension’s being a sec-
ondary process to text comprehension have been largely 
ignored, but they follow directly from what have been 
widely presumed to be critical features of the metacogni-
tive system. The initial and current models of metacogni-
tion presume that different cognitive processes are occur-
ring at two separate levels, referred to as procedural versus 
metaprocedural, cognitive versus metacognitive, or ob-
ject level versus metalevel (e.g., Fischer & Mandl, 1984; 
Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Comprehension 
involves attention to and processing at the object level, 
where the object is the text, whereas metacomprehen-
sion involves attention to and processing at the metalevel, 
where the focus is upon one’s own mental processes and 
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representation of the text. In addition, the act of monitoring 
consists of an imbalanced “dominance relation” in which 
the metalevel is secondary to and must “be informed by 
the object-level” (Nelson & Narens, 1994, pp. 11–12). 
Our present hypotheses are derived largely from this basic 
assumption that monitoring is a secondary process addi-
tional to the primary process of comprehension.
Once one accepts this dual-processing assumption, sev-
eral interesting implications unfold. When readers have 
only a single exposure to the text, as is most often the 
case in metacomprehension research, the success of the 
secondary process of metacomprehension may depend 
on whether it can be carried out concurrently with all of 
the comprehension processes that include even the lowest 
level text decoding. An explicit judgment of comprehen-
sion is presumably informed by, but is not the same as, at-
tending to and encoding metalevel cues that could be later 
used in those explicit judgments. The actual judgments 
may still occur after reading, as they almost always do in 
metacomprehension research. However, the accuracy of 
those judgments will depend on whether or not the reader 
attended to the metalevel during reading and encoded the 
comprehension cues that are generated by and made most 
available during the reading process.
Without this concurrent attention, readers will have ac-
cess to less metalevel information that provides the basis 
for inferring their comprehension levels whenever they do 
make their judgments. The less attention readers pay to the 
metalevel during reading, the more their judgments will be 
dominated by the metalevel information generated by the 
end of the text that happens to be active postreading. This 
metalevel information may be unrepresentative of their 
comprehension of the overall text. Except for rather short 
and simple texts, this postreading monitoring is likely to 
produce inaccurate judgments.
Readers are faced with the conundrum that monitoring 
may be most effective when done concurrently with read-
ing, yet attending to the metalevel while processing the text 
may be quite difficult, due to cognitive constraints. One of 
the earliest theoretical treatments of metacomprehension 
foreshadowed the potential problem posed by concurrent 
monitoring and text processing by noting that we might 
expect “bottlenecks in processing capacity or some kind 
of interference between the metaprocedural and procedural 
levels” (Fischer & Mandl, 1984, p. 231). When accurate 
judgments require concurrent monitoring, both individual-
differences and contextual factors related to executing the 
tasks in parallel should influence monitoring accuracy.
Accuracy could be influenced by individual-difference 
factors that either impact the ease with which readers can 
process text (e.g., reading ability) or are more generally 
related to concurrent-processing efficiency (e.g., working 
memory capacity [WMC]). Reading ability will impact the 
difficulty of the primary object-level task of text process-
ing. Some readers struggle with one or more of the sub-
processes involved in comprehension (e.g., Keenan, Betje-
mann, Wadsworth, DeFries, & Olson, 2006; Perfetti, 1985; 
Yuill & Oakhill, 1991). Thus, they should be limited in their 
ability to concurrently carry out the task of monitoring. A 
second individual difference, WMC, is theorized and op-
erationalized in terms of attentional control and concurrent 
processing efficacy (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Engle, Kane, 
& Tuholski, 1999). Readers who have limited WMC should 
have difficulty shifting their attention to the metalevel; thus, 
they may simply focus on the primary task of text process-
ing. Reading ability and WMC relate via different pathways 
to concurrently executing text processing and monitoring; 
thus, they should independently influence judgment accu-
racy, when accuracy depends on concurrent monitoring.
In previous research, the hypothesized relationship be-
tween WMC and monitoring accuracy has not been exam-
ined, and only limited support has been found for a rela-
tionship between reading ability and monitoring accuracy. 
Some studies have shown evidence consistent with a posi-
tive relationship (Bol & Hacker, 2001; Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, 
& Dwight, 2005; Garner, 1987; Glover, 1989; Hacker, 
Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; Maki & Berry, 1984; Maki, 
Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005; Schneider, 1985), but 
others have failed to show any relationship (Glenberg & 
Epstein, 1985; Maki, Jonas, & Kallod, 1994; Maki & Swett, 
1987; Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, 1987). 
Unfortunately, this body of studies contains such enormous 
variability in the factors that could moderate ability effects 
or the capacity to observe them (e.g., text characteristics, 
test characteristics, or the way reading ability is measured) 
that they provide little insight into whether, when, or why 
reading ability might affect monitoring accuracy.
If monitoring accuracy depends on attending to the meta-
level during reading and lower ability readers have difficulty 
attending to the metalevel during effortful text processing, 
the monitoring accuracy of these readers should benefit 
from contexts that reduce the required text processing. Dur-
ing an immediate second reading, many of the subprocesses 
involved in reading do not need to be reexecuted (e.g., Mil-
lis, Simon, & tenBrock, 1998; Perfetti, 1985). This reduc-
tion in the need for low-level text processing means that 
readers who otherwise struggle to monitor during text pro-
cessing could focus more attention at the metalevel. Thus, 
their monitoring accuracy could improve during rereading. 
Sizable increases in monitoring accuracy have been ob-
served as a result of having readers read each text twice 
before making their judgments of understanding (Dunlo-
sky & Rawson, 2005; Rawson, Dunlosky, & Thiede, 2000; 
but see Maki, Holder, & McGuire, 2001). Importantly, 
previous research has not viewed the rereading effect in 
terms of reducing the need for concurrent processing, nor 
have the potential interactions between rereading and cog-
nitive constraints been examined. However, prior results 
are compatible with the current perspective, and Dunlosky 
and Rawson (2005) have noted that “rereading may afford 
more resources for comprehension monitoring” (p. 51).
Experiment 1 employed naturalistic texts and tests 
that would be likely to create a context in which the text-
processing demands would be high and the accuracy of 
metacomprehension judgments would depend on concur-
rent monitoring. The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine 
how rereading can affect monitoring accuracy and how 
this effect is moderated by individual differences in the 
ability to execute the components of text processing that 
reading requires.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and Design
As partial fulfillment of a course requirement, 75 introductory 
psychology students were randomly assigned to either a read-once 
or a reread condition. Three participants were dropped due to a lack 
of variance in their judgments. Both of the present experiments em-
ployed the most common measure of metacomprehension monitor-
ing—relative accuracy, or resolution (Nelson, 1984)—which mea-
sures whether readers can judge their understanding of each text 
relative to other texts, rather than against some absolute referent, 
such as complete understanding. 
Materials and Measures
Texts. The texts were five explanatory texts that described com-
plex causal phenomena from the natural or social sciences (i.e., anti-
biotic use causing allergies, biological evolution, volcano formation 
and eruption, racial differences on IQ tests, and ice ages). The texts 
varied from 650–900 words in length and had Flesch–Kincaid grade 
levels of 11–12 and Flesch reading ease scores in the difficult range 
of 31–49 (see the Appendix). The antibiotics text served as a practice 
trial, and the others served as the target texts used in the analyses.
Comprehension tests. The comprehension tests were inference 
verification tests (IVTs), designed to assess situation-level representa-
tions that could not be answered using only surface memory for the 
text (Royer, Carlo, Dufresne, & Mestre, 1996). The test for each text 
consisted of 16–20 statements that readers judged as “true or false, 
based upon what [they] read in the text.” The statements were not 
simple paraphrases or negations but, rather, assertions that were either 
consistent or inconsistent with inferences that were logically implied 
by one or more assertions in the text. The set of items were designed to 
provide relatively complete coverage of all the central ideas and their 
implicit logical relations (see the Appendix for examples).
Comprehension ability. For several reasons, readers’ ability to 
process and comprehend text was assessed using a composite factor 
score of readers’ performance across the IVTs for the four target 
texts. A principal-factors analysis was performed (no rotation neces-
sary), yielding a single factor with loading values that represented 
the degree to which each individual test shared common variance 
with each other test. These loading values were used as regression 
weights to compute a factor score for each reader. Principal-factors 
analysis incorporates only shared variance among the tests; thus, 
factor scores can be meaningfully interpreted as representing a latent 
construct (e.g., comprehension ability) that exerts a common influ-
ence across tests, independently of influences such as interest or 
topic knowledge that might influence any individual test. 
A more traditional ability measure, such as the Nelson–Denny 
(N–D), was not used for several reasons. The texts and tests in stan-
dardized measures such as the N–D are focused on surface memory 
for details, rather than on situation-level comprehension of intertextual 
relations that are the focus of our texts and the present research goals 
(see Magliano, Millis, Ozurub, & McNamara, 2007). Use of such a set 
of texts and tests not only would fail to capture important variance in 
the processing of complex, attention-demanding texts, but also could 
create problems of fatigue and interactions arising from presenting 
two sets of texts with fundamentally different structures and expected 
comprehension levels (see Wiley, Griffin, & Thiede, 2005). 
Although performance on the target tests was used in the compu-
tation of both comprehension skill and metacomprehension, each 
measure is independent, due to the use of different and orthogonal 
variance related to test performance. Comprehension ability scores 
are dependent only on the weighted average of the absolute levels 
of performance across the tests. Which test a reader performed best 
and worst on, relative to each other test, has no statistical bearing 
upon this ability score. Conversely, relative monitoring accuracy 
scores are not affected by absolute performance and depend only 
on these relative differences in performance that do not affect the 
ability measure. In fact, the most often touted advantage of relative 
accuracy scores is their statistical independence from ability or other 
factors represented by the aggregate absolute level of performance 
that constitutes our ability measure (Nelson, 1984, 1996). 
To validate the assumption that the IVT scores share a common 
influence from a general comprehension ability factor, 50 pilot par-
ticipants completed both the IVT tests for the target texts and the 
N–D Reading Comprehension Test (Form H). The single computed 
factor (accounting for 48% of the variance) for the IVT scores cor-
related with the N–D scores at r  .64 ( p  .05). The assumption 
that the IVT factor scores represent a general latent construct (such 
as comprehension ability) was further supported by the fact that its 
correlation with N–D was greater than that of any IVT score for the 
individual texts (rs  .27–.54).
Procedure
All materials were presented and responses recorded via com-
puter. The participants were given a general summary of the tasks 
and their order. Following this verbal overview, all the participants 
read a brief instruction page which stated, “In this experiment you 
will be asked to read several texts so that you understand them.” 
The read-once instruction also stated, “Read each text carefully one 
time, as though studying for an exam.” The reread instruction stated, 
“Read the text quickly the first time just to get the gist or basic idea 
of the passage. Then, read it the second time more carefully, as if 
studying for an exam.” Texts were presented one paragraph at a time, 
and the readers advanced to the next paragraph at their own pace. 
After the last paragraph, the rereading participants were automati-
cally rerouted to the beginning of the text. After reading, the partici-
pants were asked, “How well do you think you understand the text 
you just read?” using a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very well); then 
they completed the comprehension test. They repeated this read, 
judge, test sequence for each text. 
Results
Descriptives, Judgments, and Test Performance
Mean judgment magnitude did not significantly differ 
between conditions [t(70)  1.52, n.s.; see Table 1 for mean 
judgments and test performance]. Even though average test 
performance varied from 60% to 85% correct among the 
four target texts, the patterns of mean performance among 
the texts were the same for the read-once and reread condi-
tions, and the conditions did not differ in mean performance 
on any of the tests [all ts(70)  0.75, n.s.].
Metacomprehension Monitoring Accuracy
Relative monitoring accuracy was computed using Pear-
son correlations of each participant’s judgments with his or 
her corresponding test performances.1 Monitoring accuracy 
scores were regressed onto reading condition, reading abil-
ity, and the computed interaction term. Table 2 reports the 
resulting beta weights and t values of the regression. There 
was a main effect of rereading, so that monitoring accuracy 
for the reread condition (M  .46, SEM  .06) was signifi-
cantly better than that for the read-once condition (M  .22, 
SEM  .10). There was no main effect of comprehension 
ability. However, there was a significant comprehension 
ability  rereading interaction (see Figure 1). Comprehen-
sion ability accounted for a sizable amount of the variance 
in monitoring accuracy when the participants read the texts 
only once (R2  .25) but accounted for no variance when 
they read the texts twice (R2  .00). Rereading produced 
marked accuracy improvements for low-ability readers, but 
not for higher ability readers.
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Discussion
The observed interaction between comprehension 
ability and rereading on monitoring accuracy is consis-
tent with the concurrent-processing assumption. Lower 
ability readers struggled to successfully monitor their 
performance during a single reading but were able to 
monitor equally well as high-ability readers when they 
read the texts twice. The lack of any rereading effect on 
test performance itself is not surprising, given a simi-
lar lack of rereading effects in some previous research 
(e.g., Dunlosky & Rawson, 2005; Dunlosky, Rawson, 
& Hacker, 2002). In addition, the present tests were de-
signed to measure inference-level comprehension. Re-
reading may afford an opportunity to process the text at a 
more conceptual level. However, without special instruc-
tion or training, such as that introduced by McNamara 
(2004), typical college students may not take advantage 
of that opportunity and may continue to process the text 
at a surface level that fosters memorizing details, rather 
than constructing intertextual inferences.
A limitation of Experiment 1 is the fact that compre-
hension skill is an indirect indicator of text-processing 
difficulty. Furthermore, both comprehension ability and 
monitoring are components of reading skills more gener-
ally and likely share a number of common influences. Be-
sides replication, two major goals of Experiment 2 were 
to examine whether WMC has a similar but independent 
relationship with monitoring accuracy and rereading, and 
to introduce a reading strategy manipulation that could 
improve accuracy for readers of all levels.
EXPERIMENT 2
The effect of comprehension ability and its interaction 
with rereading in Experiment 1 are presumed to result from 
the amount of effort and attention required for the text-
processing task itself in the single-read condition. As com-
prehension ability increases, the attention required for text 
processing decreases, and more attention can be directed to 
monitoring metalevel cues. WMC should impact monitor-
ing accuracy and interact with rereading in a similar pattern 
as comprehension ability, but for slightly different reasons. 
WMC is presumed to impact the efficiency and costs of 
concurrent-processing situations.2 Thus, in the face of 
high text-processing demands, higher WMC should allow 
readers to more efficiently devote some of their attention 
to monitoring metalevel cues about their comprehension. 
Thus, the predicted result is that monitoring of low-WMC 
readers should suffer in single-read conditions because of 
their inability to control their attention and less efficient 
execution of whatever concurrent processing is required.
An additional goal of Experiment 2 was to introduce a 
new manipulation that, unlike rereading, would improve 
monitoring accuracy for all readers, particularly for ex-
planatory texts where comprehension involves construct-
ing a situation model in which the explicit and implied 
causal and logical interrelations among text ideas and 
with prior knowledge are represented (Kintsch, 1994). 
The text comprehension literature holds important lessons 
for metacomprehension research—namely, that certain 
texts and tests foster and allow for assessment of surface-
 memory versus situation-model-level comprehension and 
that the quality of one level of representation need not 
correspond to or be a valid predictor of the quality at other 
levels (Kintsch, 1998; Wiley et al., 2005).
These level-of-representation issues not only are im-
portant for the design of appropriate texts and tests; they 
also directly imply that effective monitoring of cues re-
lated to mere recall of surface representations may have 
limited accuracy in predicting performance that is depen-
dent on the quality of one’s situation model. This impli-
cation is compatible with the more general and increas-
ingly popular cue utilization view, which holds that “the 
accuracy of metacognitive judgments . . . should depend 
on the validity of the cues on which [they] rest” (Koriat, 
Table 1 
Mean Judgment Magnitude and Proportion Correct for Each Target Text  
by Reading Condition (With Standard Errors of the Means)
Proportion Correct on IVT
Judgment Race and IQ Volcanoes Evolution Ice Ages
 Condition  M  SEM  M  SEM  M  SEM  M  SEM  M  SEM
Experiment 1
 Read once 4.17 .18 .85 .01  .69 .02 .64 .02 .60 .02
 Reread 4.54 .16 .83 .01  .69 .02  .66 .02 .58 .02
Experiment 2
 Read once 4.60 .20 .81 .02  .69 .02 .67 .02 .61 .02
 Reread 4.45 .17  .79 .02  .69 .02 .68 .02 .57 .02
 Self-explain 4.62 .16  .85 .02 .71 .02 .67 .02 .60 .02
Note—No between-condition differences were significant at p  .05. IVT, inference verification test.
Table 2 
Stepwise Regression of Metacomprehension Accuracy  
on Reading Condition, Comprehension Ability,  
and the Condition  Ability Interaction
Variables
 Condition  B  SEB  ;  t Value  
Step 1 (R2  .08)
 Rereading .28 .10 .31 2.86*
 Comprehension ability .10 .06 .18 1.55*
Step 2 (R2  .20)
 Rereading  ability .42 .13 .35 3.22*
Note—Statistically significant ( p  .05) betas are those retained in the 
final model. *p  .05.
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2007, p. 295). Also, a number of metacognitive research-
ers have suggested that individuals generally base their 
judgments on superficial cues that are not valid predictors 
of the assessed test performance (e.g., Benjamin, Bjork, 
& Schwartz, 1998; Dunlosky et al., 2002; Koriat, 1997). 
Furthermore, both high- and low-ability readers report 
basing their metacomprehension judgments on surface-
level recall cues (Thiede & Anderson, 2004).
By combining these common perspectives in the meta-
cognition and text comprehension literatures, we can infer 
that even when readers pay ample attention to the meta-
level during reading, judgment accuracy will be limited if 
test performance requires situation-level comprehension 
and readers monitor only surface-level cues. This could 
explain why high-ability readers failed to benefit from the 
increased opportunity for monitoring during rereading in 
Experiment 1. With this in mind, we introduced a reading 
task of self-explanation, which has previously been shown 
to focus readers on their  situation-level text representa-
tions (Chi, 2000; Wiley & Voss, 1999) and, thus, should 
increase the salience of cues predictive of inference test 
performance. We presumed that self- explaining would in-
crease access to valid cues, as opposed to rereading, which 
we assumed impacted attention to the metalevel more gen-
erally. Thus, we expected self-explanation to improve ac-
curacy for all the readers above that with mere rereading.
Method
Participants and Design
Ninety-four introductory psychology students were randomly as-
signed to a read-once, reread, or self-explanation condition. Two par-
ticipants were dropped due to a lack of variance in their judgments.
Materials and Procedure
In the first session, the participants completed two measures of 
WMC, reading span (Rspan) and operation span (Ospan). In accord 
with the procedures described in Conway et al. (2005), the participants 
evaluated the correctness of sets of 2–5 sentences (Rspan) or simple 
arithmetic problems (Ospan), while concurrently encoding and retain-
ing for later recall the single letters (Rspan) or words (Ospan) that 
appeared next to each sentence or problem. Scores were computed 
on the basis of the proportion of letters or words correctly recalled for 
each set. The average score across Rspan and Opsan was computed 
to generate a composite that represented a general attentional control 
measure independent of the reading or math abilities that could influ-
ence each individual score. Mean WMC scores were equivalent for 
the read-once (M  .63, SD  .14), reread (M  .63, SD  .15), and 
self-explain (M  .65, SD  .14) conditions [F(2,89)  1, n.s.].
In the second session, all materials and procedures were identical 
to those in Experiment 1, with the exception of a written instruction 
read in the self-explanation condition, based on the work of Chi (2000; 
Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994). The self- explanation in-
struction added the following to the reread instruction: 
As you read the text the second time, you should try to explain 
to yourself the meaning and relevance of each sentence or para-
graph to the overall purpose of the text. Ask yourself questions 
like: What new information does this paragraph add? How does 
it relate to previous paragraphs? Does it provide important in-
sights into the major theme of the text? Does the paragraph 
raise new questions in your mind? So, try your best to think 
about these issues and ask yourself these kinds of questions 
about the text as you read it for the second time.
The instruction also provided a 50-word example text and hypo-
thetical self-explanation comments for each sentence.
As a manipulation check, time on task was analyzed for the par-
ticipants in the self-explanation and rereading conditions. On aver-
age, the explainers’ time per text (M  365.66 sec, SD  88.25) was 
14.35% longer than the rereaders’ time (M  319.78 sec, SD  89.62) 
[t(59)  2.02, p  .05]. This suggests that the readers were engaging 
in some additional processing in the self-explanation condition.
Results
Judgments and Test Performance
Mean judgment magnitude did not reliably differ among 
conditions [F(2,89)  0.30, MSe  0.93; see Table 1]. Mean 
test performance varied in the same manner as in Experi-
Figure 1. Monitoring accuracy as a function of reading condition and 
comprehension ability (Experiment 1).
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ment 1; again, the pattern of performance across texts was 
the same for each condition, and performance did not reli-
ably differ between conditions on any of the tests [Fs(2,89)  
1.20, MSe  0.02], except for RaceIQ [F(2,89)  2.23, 
MSe  0.01, p  .10]. The marginal effect of condition on 
the RaceIQ text resulted from the self-explain group’s per-
forming slightly better than the other groups.
Metacomprehension Monitoring Accuracy
Comprehension ability and WMC scores were positively 
correlated at Pearson’s r  .32, and neither showed a reli-
able bivariate correlation with relative monitoring accuracy 
(Pearson’s rs  .10 and .12, respectively). In accord with 
Aiken and West (1991, p. 71), the three reading conditions 
were dummy coded into two variables that, when entered 
together in a regression, represented the effect of reread-
ing, as compared with reading once, and the effect of self-
 explanation, as compared with rereading. Also, each dummy 
variable was multiplied by both comprehension ability and 
WMC scores to compute corresponding interaction terms. 
Relative accuracy scores were regressed onto the predictors 
in three steps, as detailed in Table 3, along with the betas 
and corresponding t tests for each predictor. The greater 
accuracy for rereading (M  .39, SEM  .07) over read-
ing once (M  .21, SEM  .09) was not significant. How-
ever, self-explanation reliably improved accuracy (M  .63, 
SEM  .07) over rereading. Neither comprehension ability 
nor WMC had an overall relationship with accuracy.
As in Experiment 1, comprehension ability interacted 
significantly with rereading (see Figure 2). Lower abil-
ity readers had particularly poor accuracy when they read 
only once (R2  .16), but their accuracy was higher when 
they reread (whereas that of higher ability readers remained 
unchanged), to the point where ability no longer predicted 
accuracy in the reread condition (R2  .01). In contrast to 
rereading, the positive effect of self-explaining did not in-
teract with ability, and there was no relationship between 
accuracy and ability in the self-explain condition (R2  .01). 
Likewise, WMC interacted with rereading, but not with self-
explanation (see Figure 3). Lower WMC readers had poorer 
monitoring accuracy when reading once (R2  .21) but ben-
efited from rereading to the extent that WMC no longer af-
fected accuracy (R2  .01). The benefits of self- explaining 
above rereading were unrelated to WMC (R2  .00).
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the comprehension ability  
rereading effect and demonstrated that WMC also inter-
acts with rereading. Although the pattern of results for 
comprehension ability and WMC were nearly identical, 
their effects were independent, as evidenced by their re-
tention in the final stepwise model. In fact, if compre-
hension ability is entirely removed from the analyses, the 
Table 3 
Stepwise Regression of Metacomprehension Accuracy on 
Condition, Comprehension Ability, Working Memory Capacity 
(WMC), and the Condition  Ability Interactions
Variables
 Condition  B  SEB  ;  t Value  
Step 1 (R2  .12)
 Rereading vs. once .19 .11 .19 1.67**
 Explain vs. rereading .30 .08 .34 3.63*
 Comprehension ability .02 .06 .06 0.56
 WMC .24 .32 .09 0.90
Step 2 (R2  .17)
 Rereading  ability .28 .14 .19 2.00*
 Explain  ability .09 .12 .03 0.32
Step 3 (R2  .23)
 Rereading  WMC 1.58 .60 .25 2.62*
 Explain  WMC .13 .73 .01 0.08
Note—Statistically significant ( p  .05) betas are those retained in the 
final model. *p  .05. **p  .10.
Figure 2. Monitoring accuracy as a function of reading condition and 
comprehension ability (Experiment 2).
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WMC  rereading ; increases only from .25 to .28. The 
independence of the WMC effect on accuracy is consistent 
with our assumption that both comprehension skill and 
WMC affect monitoring via their independent relations 
to concurrent monitoring during text processing. Com-
prehension skill affects the attention and effort required 
for text processing, whereas WMC impacts the efficiency 
of switching attention between the two tasks and, thus, 
between the object level and the metalevel.
In addition, giving readers an instruction to self-explain 
during rereading led to a significant improvement in moni-
toring accuracy for all the readers, unlike rereading by 
itself, which showed no benefits for high-ability readers. 
This qualitative difference between the effects suggests a 
qualitative difference in the constraints impacted by reread-
ing and self-explaining. The rereading effect and its inter-
action with both comprehension ability and WMC can be 
accounted for by assuming that rereading reduces the need 
for low-level text processing that otherwise makes it dif-
ficult for some readers to attend to available metalevel cues 
about their comprehension. The more general effect of self-
explanation and the lack of an interaction with individual-
difference measures suggest that this effect is not tied to 
processing constraints that impede monitoring efforts.
Neither the rereading nor the self-explanation effects 
can be attributed to effects on test performance itself, be-
cause the groups did not differ in test performance. The 
lack of a rereading effect on comprehension itself is consis-
tent with prior findings (e.g., Dunlosky & Rawson, 2005; 
Dunlosky et al., 2002). The self-explanation instruction 
used here was not designed to impact test performance, 
because it did not involve the practice, feedback, or train-
ing in constructing quality explanations that has been cen-
tral to interventions designed to increase comprehension 
itself (e.g., Chi, 2000; McNamara, 2004). Instead, our 
brief self-explanation instruction was intended to prompt 
readers merely to attempt intertextual explanations, with 
the assumption that this would increase readers’ access to 
valid metalevel cues, so that their judgments of compre-
hension would be based on valid cues related to the quality 
of their situation model.
It is not necessary for readers to actually construct a 
good explanation; they just need to attempt to create any 
explanation in order to increase the salience and acces-
sibility of inference-predicting cues. Indeed, the effect of 
self-explanation on monitoring accuracy, but not on test 
performance, suggests that it was the attempt to explain, 
and not the successful production of a high-quality expla-
nation, that led to the accuracy effects. This further ac-
counts for the fact that ability and WMC differences did 
not interact with the self-explanation condition. Higher 
ability readers might construct superior explanations, 
but all the readers could attempt to explain, which is pre-
sumably what gave them access to valid cues. Thus, the 
improvement in monitoring performance, the lack of im-
provement in test performance, and the lack of an explana-
tion  ability interaction can all be explained by the cue 
access account of the self-explanation effect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the present experiments reveal that vari-
ance in the accuracy of monitoring judgments is related to 
contextual factors (i.e., single vs. multiple readings) and 
reader characteristics (i.e., individual differences in com-
prehension ability and WMC) that are plausibly related to 
being able to monitor metalevel cues during the primary 
task of text processing. The present assumptions account 
for the findings, particularly the independent interactions 
between rereading and both comprehension ability and 
Figure 3. Monitoring accuracy as a function of reading condition and 
working memory capacity.
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WMC, the unmoderated effect of self-explaining, and the 
fact that comprehension and metacomprehension accu-
racy diverged in their relationships to other variables.
The core assumptions underlying the present work are the 
following: that metacognitive monitoring is a distinct process 
secondary to the processes being monitored (e.g., comprehen-
sion); that some comprehension-predicting cues are less acces-
sible after reading than during reading; that readers’ success at 
engaging in concurrent monitoring will depend on available 
attentional resources; and that even with concurrent monitor-
ing, the types of cues readers typically attend to will have only 
limited relevance to situation-model-level comprehension. 
The present findings do not directly test these assumptions 
but, rather, take them as a starting place from which all our 
hypotheses and interpretations were derived. Regarding the 
first of these assumptions, it is inherent in the basic formula-
tions of the metacognitive construct (Fischer & Mandl, 1984; 
Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990), and it is unclear how 
any construct that could reasonably be labeled metacognitive 
monitoring would not be a secondary process to whatever is 
being monitoring at the object level. The other core assump-
tions are less self-evident but seem to be in step with more gen-
eral assumptions in the memory, attention, and metacompre-
hension literatures. The novel contribution of the present work 
lies in combining these various assumptions and identifying 
their implications for how potential individual differences and 
contextual factors ought to moderate monitoring accuracy.
Our account of the present findings implies that the im-
portant factor underlying the rereading  ability/WMC 
interactions is the varying extent to which readers were 
able to encode metalevel cues during reading, rather than 
merely waiting until their postreading judgment to pay 
any attention to metalevel information. The evidence that 
accuracy was impacted by the ability to attend to the meta-
level while reading is indirect. The core assumptions that 
we have laid out suggest the following: that such concur-
rent monitoring would likely influence monitoring accu-
racy; that comprehension ability, WMC, and rereading 
would be expected to influence one’s ability to execute 
such concurrent processing; and that each of the observed 
findings are what would be expected if concurrent moni-
toring was having an influence.
However, we did not directly observe when readers were 
monitoring or whether any readers actually did monitor while 
reading, rather than entirely at the time of judgment. Thus, 
it is important to consider alternatives that might account 
for the findings. It is possible that all the readers engaged 
only in postreading monitoring. Perhaps rereading merely 
gives readers a larger sample of experiences to reflect back 
on during retrospective judgment; but such an effect should 
be equal for readers of all ability levels, and it was not. Al-
ternatively, it may be that readers need to process the text 
at a conceptual level before their reading experiences be-
come predictive of comprehension, and such processing is 
least likely to occur for lower ability readers during a single 
reading. However, this account seems to allow WMC to in-
fluence accuracy only via its influence on comprehension 
itself; thus, it fails to explain the independent WMC effects. 
Other possibilities may exist, but their plausibility will be 
tested by their ability to account for the totality of the find-
ings, particularly the independent interactions between re-
reading and both comprehension ability and WMC, plus the 
main effect of self-explanation that implies that its source of 
influence is qualitatively different from whatever is respon-
sible for the rereading effect. A challenge for future research 
is to come up with more direct but unobtrusive methods for 
assessing when monitoring is actually occurring.
Self-Explaining and Monitoring  
of the Situation Model
Self-explaining and rereading appear to improve ac-
curacy in different ways. If rereading increases attention 
to metalevel cues available during reading, perhaps self-
 explanation increases readers’ access to certain types of 
cues that are most indicative of situation-model-level 
comprehension. This cue access interpretation of the self-
explanation effect is quite compatible with the increasingly 
popular cue utilization view that emphasizes cue validity 
more generally (e.g., Koriat, 1997; Maki, 1998; Rawson & 
Dunlosky, 2002; Weaver et al., 1995). It is also compatible 
with more recent emphases on situation-level cues for pre-
dicting performance requiring conceptual understanding 
(e.g., Dunlosky & Rawson, 2005; Wiley et al., 2005). One 
of the largest and most robust improvements in accuracy 
has been produced by the use of prejudgment generation 
tasks (e.g., summary or keyword listing) that require read-
ers to access their representations (accuracy levels around 
.6–.7; Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 2003; Thiede, 
Dunlosky, Griffin, & Wiley, 2005). The fact that summary 
and keyword effects critically depend on a delay between 
reading and generation has been interpreted as resulting 
from the decay of surface representations that forces read-
ers to access their situation models, giving them more 
valid cues for predicting inference-level comprehension 
(Thiede et al., 2005). However, those findings could also 
be explained by a simple transfer-appropriate- monitoring 
(TAM) hypothesis, due to the greater processing similar-
ity (i.e., long-term memory retrieval) between delayed 
generation and delayed testing. In contrast, the present 
findings favor a cue accessibility interpretation over the 
TAM hypothesis, because self-explanation during reading 
is quite unlike the process of inference verification after 
reading. Just as Dunlosky, Rawson, and Middleton (2005) 
recently argued regarding their effects of term-specific 
judgments, it is not some match between the judgment and 
performance processes themselves (as presumed by TAM), 
but rather that the cues produced by the judgment process 
allow for valid inferences about performance.
Use of different cues or just more of the same? 
Again, we did not directly observe the types of cues the 
readers were monitoring; thus, it is conceivable that the 
self- explanation task merely increased the quantity of 
monitoring but that all the groups accessed and monitored 
qualitatively similar types of cues. The two possibilities 
under this alternative approach would be either that all 
the readers used surface cues or that all the readers used 
situation- level cues. The notion that surface-level cues 
were used by all the readers is suspect because it seems im-
plausible that surface cues would be so highly predictive of 
performance on an inference test. Self-explainers reached 
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an uncommonly high level of accuracy (.63) in predict-
ing their inference performance. The idea that surface cues 
would predict inference performance so well is at odds 
with common views about the relative independence of 
representation quality between levels (e.g., Kintsch, 1998) 
and the need for a match between the representation levels 
of the cues and the assessment items (e.g., Koriat, 1997), 
especially considering that the test materials were specifi-
cally created to keep the surface and the inference levels 
distinct. Alternatively, the notion that everyone, even the 
readers in the read-once condition, relied on situation-level 
cues contradicts findings and common views that readers 
typically rely on superficial, surface-level monitoring cues 
to judge their level of comprehension (for a review, see 
Maki, 1998). For example, Thiede and Anderson (2004) 
found that both high- and low-skilled readers report rely-
ing heavily on surface-level memory cues.
More important, the present empirical findings show 
a qualitative difference between rereading and self-
 explanation effects, with only the latter increasing accu-
racy for readers of all ability levels. This qualitative differ-
ence suggests a distinction in the underlying mechanisms 
responsible for the effects. Thus, using a more-of-the-
same account for both the rereading and the self-explain 
effects raises problems. Although we find the more-of-
the-same account theoretically less plausible than a cue 
access account, we are currently conducting a series of 
studies using a test expectancy paradigm that directly tests 
whether the benefits of increased monitoring are contin-
gent upon its being directed toward the level of representa-
tion that matches the one being assessed.
Potential Moderators of Ability  
and Rereading Effects
It is empirically true that the benefits of rereading were 
not observed for higher ability readers and that an overall 
rereading effect would not have been observed without 
the inclusion of low-ability readers in this sample. Thus, 
in the present context, reader ability and rereading inter-
acted and moderated each other. However, these results 
should not be interpreted to suggest that rereading will 
always benefit low-ability readers or that failures to ob-
serve rereading effects may always be due simply to the 
absence of low-ability readers. Instead, a combination 
of factors was likely necessary for the present results. 
Both the relatively long and the conceptually complex 
explanatory texts, plus the inference-level tests employed 
in these studies, may be important components, because 
they likely increase the need for concurrent monitoring to 
produce accurate judgments. We contend that such texts 
and tests are needed to research metacomprehension, and 
not just metamemory (Wiley et al., 2005), but they may 
also be important in creating a context in which concur-
rent monitoring is important and factors such as reader 
ability and rereading have room to play a role in success-
ful monitoring.
It is difficult to determine the reasons for prior null re-
sults and the failed replications for ability and rereading ef-
fects in the literature, given the myriad of potential factors 
at play. As was noted previously, the materials and ability 
measures have all varied greatly across studies. In addi-
tion, reviews of the literature have revealed problems with 
many prior studies including unreliable measures (such as 
single-item tests), which necessarily limits the theoretical 
implications that can be drawn (for reviews, see Weaver, 
1990; Wiley et al., 2005). However, future research that 
manipulates methodological features such as the nature 
of the texts and tests that are used would help elucidate 
the boundaries of ability and rereading effects and would 
further evaluate the concurrent-processing assumption and 
the breadth of circumstances under which it holds.
Conclusions
Both rereading and self-explanation improved monitor-
ing accuracy, but in somewhat different ways, suggesting 
influences on different constraining factors. Our account 
for these effects presumes that they may be particular to 
situations in which relatively long texts explain complex 
causal (or logical) relations about which readers must 
draw inferences and build a situation model. In such con-
texts, rereading may afford benefits to some readers who, 
due to various processing constraints, are struggling to 
concurrently process the texts and monitor the metalevel 
cues regarding the quality of their mental representations. 
In another vein, self-explaining may make monitoring 
generally more effective by increasing the access and sa-
lience of cues that are actually predictive of performance 
that requires inference- and situation-model-level under-
standing. The results indicated that both a rereading ma-
nipulation that reduced concurrent-processing demands 
and a self- explanation manipulation that increased access 
to inference- level comprehension cues improved moni-
toring accuracy. Notably, the self-explanation instruction 
produced a very high level of accuracy (.63) comparable 
to the best levels of metacomprehension monitoring that 
have been found in the literature thus far (Thiede et al., 
2005). Taken together, the results suggest that metacom-
prehension accuracy is constrained both by the ability of 
the reader to engage in monitoring during reading and by 
access to valid cues. Future consideration of how accuracy 
may depend on individual differences in readers’ abilities, 
or readers’ task misconstrual and reliance on suboptimal 
cues, should be helpful toward understanding why accu-
racy is notoriously poor and how, when, and for whom 
accuracy can be improved.
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APPENDIX
Excerpt of Ice Ages Passage
An ice age is a period of time—usually millions or tens of millions of years—when vast glaciers cover as 
much as a third of the Earth’s land surface. Average global temperatures can drop by as many as 12 degrees 
Celsius overall. The latest Ice Age began about 2.5 million years ago, and ended approximately 15,000 years ago. 
Average global temperatures decreased by approximately 8 degrees Celsius. Sea-level was lowered substantially 
due to the amount of water that was frozen in the glaciers. Ice core analysis indicated there were reduced amounts 
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Giant ice sheets that originated at the North Pole advanced and retreated 
many times in North America and Europe. The movement of the glaciers coincided with cycles of warm and cold 
periods in the Earth’s temperature. Throughout history, cycles of changes in global temperatures usually occur 
every 100,000 years or so. Each cycle consists of a long, generally cold period during which the entire Earth 
cools, followed by a relatively short warm period during which Earth warms up rapidly.
We are now in a warming period that has lasted more than 10,000 years, which is longer than many of the 
previous warming intervals. Warm temperatures over the last century have been attributed to the increased man-
made release of carbon dioxide. CO2 prevents long-wave radiation from escaping from the Earth into space. 
The more CO2 there is in the atmosphere, the more long-wave radiation is kept from leaving the Earth. The 
more radiation that is trapped, the hotter the Earth becomes. This trapping of radiation works like a gardener’s 
greenhouse, and this phenomenon is commonly known as the “Greenhouse Effect.”
Example Inference Verification Questions (and Correct Answers)
Higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere lead to higher sea levels. (True)
The Earth is almost completely covered by glaciers during an ice age. (False)
(Manuscript received July 6, 2006; 
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